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When Rational Basis Review is Irrational: An Argument for Applying 




Rational basis review under Constitutional equal protection jurisprudence 
affords the classes it protects the lowest standard of review—one that is very 
deferential to the dictates of the legislature. The Supreme Court has determined that 
individuals facing statutory discrimination solely due to economic status or wealth 
are accorded this “rational basis” standard of review. Homeless people in the United 
States have historically faced regulations and statutes that effectively criminalize 
them. Although these statutes necessarily target the homeless due to economic status, 
no court has yet determined if the homeless face statutory discrimination solely 
based on their economic status. If the homeless face statutory discrimination for any 
reasons in addition to economic status, these criminalizing statutes should be 
reviewed under a higher standard. There are three levels of heightened scrutiny: 
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis “with a bite.” This Article 
argues that the homeless—individuals, or as a class—should be accorded a 
heightened standard of review by courts reviewing the statutes that target them. It 
begins with a review of equal protection and due process precedents and a discussion 
about the homeless population in America. It continues by analyzing how a lawyer 
could best argue for applying each level of heightened scrutiny to statutes targeting 
the homeless. Unquestionably, the homeless are set further back when governing 
bodies legislate to criminalize their involuntary conduct. The judiciary should extend 
protections to this vulnerable group by reviewing the statutes criminalizing 




The mythic homeless person—the man living alone, dirty, underneath a 
bridge, suffering with drug addiction and mental infirmity—has done a severe 
disservice to the public’s perception of the homeless population. A large portion of 
the American populace believe that homelessness is a direct result of the sufferer’s 
poor choices.1 Thus, the homeless are seen as an unsympathetic group. This myth is 
just that: an untruth. In fact, homeless people come in all shapes and sizes. Many 
families, for example, suffer from homelessness as a result of eviction and lack of 
 
1  See Kyra Gurney, Miami Beach Law Limits Panhandling. Civil Rights Groups Say that Violates Free 
Speech., MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 5, 2018, 3:18 PM), 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/miami-beach/article217672810.html 
(quoting local mayor saying the “homeless include people who are mentally ill and who are dangerous to 
both residents and visitors and that can’t be ignored.”). 
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affordable housing.2 Although many of the homeless population do suffer with 
mental illness and substance abuse, “many more homeless [people] do not.”3 
The poor public perception of the homeless population has resulted, at least 
tangentially, in statutes that target this group for engaging in life-sustaining 
activities.4 Even when not explicitly targeted toward the population, homeless 
people are the de facto victims of this type of legislation.5 Anti-camping statutes, for 
example, may seem like a good enforcement tool to regulate use of public parks.6 In 
practice, however, these ordinances permit police departments to evict and arrest 
homeless people after they’ve set up “camp.”7 These statutes are termed 
“criminalization” statutes because they effectively criminalize acts that otherwise 
are considered innocent. 
Lawsuits have been filed and litigated that challenge the constitutionality of 
these criminalization statutes.8 Some of the more successful lawsuits have 
challenged statutes based on the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment.9 This Amendment prohibits punishing someone for any 
involuntary status because it is cruel and unusual to do so.10 The homeless 
plaintiffs in Pottinger argued that they were being unconstitutionally targeted by 
the City of Miami for their homeless status in contravention with the Eighth 
Amendment.11 The court agreed and held that the City’s enforcement tactics 
against the homeless, which criminalized innocent conduct like sleeping, eating, 
sitting, and more, “effectively punish[ed] them for something for which they may 
not be convicted”: acts inherent in their homeless status.12 Some would argue that 
there are already sufficient routes for lawyers to challenge statutes for their 
 
2  See generally Cynthia Griffith, Lack of Affordable Housing Remains the Leading Cause of Homelessness, 
INVISIBLE PEOPLE (Mar. 22, 2019), https://invisiblepeople.tv/lack-of-affordable-housing-remains-the-leading-
cause-of-homelessness/ (explaining how people in America cannot afford to pay rent and often become 
homeless as a consequence). 
3  ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 50 (3d ed. 2014).  
4  U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, SEARCHING OUT SOLUTIONS: CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVES TO 
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS 7 (2012). 
5  See Justin Jouvenal, Homeless Say Booming Cities Have Outlawed Their Right to Sleep, Beg, and Even Sit, 
WASH. POST (June 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/homeless-say-booming-
cities-have-outlawed-their-right-to-sleep-beg-and-even-sit/2016/06/02/7dde62ea-21e3-11e6-aa84-
42391ba52c91_story.html. 
6  Anti-camping statutes are understood to be laws that criminalize the act of sleeping or erecting tents on 
specific property. See, e.g., Nicholas May, Fourth Amendment Challenges to “Camping Ordinances”: A Legal 
Strategy to Force Legislative Solutions to Homelessness, 11 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 1, 1 (2008). 
7  See, e.g., SACRAMENTO, CAL., CITY CODE § 12.52.030 (prohibiting camping or using “camp paraphernalia” on 
any public or private property). 
8  See, e.g., Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (granting relief to class of homeless 
plaintiffs that prohibited officials from arresting homeless individuals for engaging in harmless, life-
sustaining activity); Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995) (finding ordinance challenged did 
not unconstitutionally restrict homeless individual’s right to travel and did not violate the state or federal 
constitutions by allowing punishment based on status). 
9  See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1564–65. 
10  See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). 
11  Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1564–65. 
12  Id. 
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homeless clients, like those conferring Eighth Amendment protections.13 
Unfortunately, some of these protections have proven tenuous.14  
The judiciary should review statutes involving homeless people higher 
scrutiny under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth and 
Fifth Amendments to remedy the unhoused population’s heightened vulnerability. 
The judiciary applies levels of scrutiny to statutes that affect certain classes of 
people to ensure they pass constitutional muster.15 These classes are groups that 
require further protection from officials.16 It has been decades since the first lawsuit 
advocated for homeless rights in court by challenging discriminatory statutes and 
enforcement methods.17 Still, an inordinate number of statutes target and 
criminalize the homeless.18 
For homeless individuals to be reestablished back into society, they need time 
and space; they need society to recognize their humanity.19 This requires harsher 
oversight by the judiciary over the legislation that regulates their conduct. By 
applying a higher level of scrutiny to the laws targeting the homeless population, 
governments will have less leeway to pass these criminalizing statutes or 
ordinances. Rather, the laws that are passed will be more purposeful and less 
frivolous, allowing homeless individuals the ability to rebuild their lives without 
constant fear of arrest for trespass or violation of any number of these ordinances. 
This Article argues that courts should accord homeless people higher scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to the federal Constitution. 
Lawyers could persuade the courts to apply higher scrutiny to statutes 
criminalizing the homeless in a number of ways. Section I.A of this paper will 
discuss who the homeless population is. Section I.B will examine the constitutional 
background to the arguments I make in Part II. Section I.C will review the types of 
criminalization statutes on the books and why legislatures pass them. Part II will 
 
13  For more information about Eighth Amendment Challenges and how they work in the context of 
challenging statutes criminalizing homelessness, see Edward J. Walters, No Way Out: Eighth Amendment 
Protection for Do-Or-Die Acts of the Homeless, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1619 (1995). 
14  See Jerry Ianelli, Judge Invalidates Miami’s Landmark Homeless-Protection Order from 1998, MIAMI NEW 
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019, 3:16 PM), https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/miami-judge-throws-out-pottinger-
homeless-protection-law-11087371 (discussing Miami federal judge’s decision to invalidate the Pottinger 
agreement made pursuant to findings that the homeless in the city needed further protection from city 
enforcement measures unconstitutionally criminalizing the homeless for innocent conduct). 
15  See Susannah W. Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 739, 742 (2014) (“The 
Court has, in fact, devised mechanisms that are supposed to be particularly adept at rooting out unfair 
prejudices: suspect classification analysis and the associated tiers-of-scrutiny framework.”). 
16  Id. 
17  See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1565. 
18  See generally U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, supra note 4 (discussing how criminalizing 
homelessness negatively impacts communities and individuals nationwide and how some communities have 
contributed to or remedied the problem). 
19  See generally Stephen J. Schnably, Rights of Access and the Right to Exclude: The Case of Homelessness, in 
PROPERTY LAW ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY 553 (G.E. van Maanen & A.J. van der Walt eds., 
1996) (explaining that the more that homeless people resist being pathologized and the more their relatable 
problems are recognized as such, the more potential there is to implement solutions to address 
homelessness). 
242 Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality [9:239 
review and discuss the better arguments for according the homeless heightened 
scrutiny. Section II.A focuses on strict scrutiny, Section II.B focuses on intermediate 




A. Who are the Homeless? 
 
The homeless population is innately hard to define. The McKinney-Vento Act 
(originally the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act), signed into law by 
President Clinton in 1987, was the first federal legislation to furnish a definition for 
the group.20 In short, the Act states a “homeless” person “lacks a fixed, regular, and 
adequate nighttime residence,” has a primary residence “not designed for or 
ordinarily used as a regular sleeping accommodation for human beings,” or “an 
individual or family who will imminently lose their housing.”21  
This legislation provided a foundation for defining who is “homeless,” but it 
falls short of including many others in its definition that might otherwise be 
considered homeless. For example, the Act omits people who may be staying with 
friends or family, employing short-term living arrangements like motels, and those 
in prisons or other institutions.22 The McKenny-Vento definition is still a point of 
contention for legislators, service practitioners, and scholars today because 
homeless individuals who fall outside its parameters are not eligible for support 
from the federal government.23 As a result, logging statistics about the homeless 
population is challenging. Some research groups follow the definition from the 
McKinney-Vento Act, and others make their definitions broader to include the 
groups of homeless left outside the scope of the Act’s definition.24  
To answer the question asking who composes the homeless population, it is 
important to discuss the problems with “counting” and gathering data on this 
transient, and ever-changing group. There are a number of methods that have been 
employed by the United States over time, but two methods are most commonly 
used: (1) the “point in time count”; and (2) estimating the number of people who 
have been homeless over a specific period of time.25 Both methods are imperfect. 
The “point-in-time count” is self-explanatory. Data is gathered about how 
many people are homeless over a three-day period.26 To gather this information, 
volunteers may be assigned to search a span of blocks or parks.27  These volunteers 
 
20  Jennifer Lee-Anderson, Homelessness Count Methodologies Literature Review, HOMELESSNESS RES. & 
ACTION COLLABORATIVE PUBLICATIONS & PRESENTATIONS 7 (2019). 
21  42 U.S.C. § 11302 (2012). 
22  Lee-Anderson, supra note 20. 
23  See id. 
24  See id. 
25  SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 51. 
26  How We Count People Experiencing Homelessness, U.S. CENSUS 2020, https://2020census.gov/en/what-is-
2020-census/focus/people-experiencing-homelessness.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
27  Id.; SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 51. 
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then relay information on the people they encountered to localities or 
organizations.28 These agencies utilize that information, in conjunction with 
information from city homeless shelters, to generate point-in-time estimates.29 
Unfortunately, this method has severe limitations.  It "will indicate that the extent 
of homelessness is much smaller than the size suggested by studies that look at the 
number of people who have experienced homelessness within a specified period of 
time."30 Furthermore, the study will mischaracterize the population of individuals 
who suffer homelessness because it’s more likely to cover individuals who are 
chronically homeless, rather than temporarily homeless.31 Therefore, the point-in-
time count is less accurate for gathering data on the whole homeless population and 
more accurate for gathering data on the chronically homeless population. 
On the other hand, estimating the number of people who have been homeless 
over a period of time is more likely to produce information characterizing the entire 
homeless population. These data are collected by employing numerous methods, 
including surveys via telephone and in-person interviews.32 However, this method 
faces its own hurdles because these types of studies require the surveyors to furnish 
definitions of “homeless people,” and create plans for how to reach this population—
which can be challenging, to say the least.33  One salient example reveals how these 
studies furnish more, sometimes stark, data about the homeless population. The 
2012 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress shows that in 2011, “more 
than twice as many people, 1.5 million, were in a homeless shelter or transitional 
housing facility for one or more nights during the year than were homeless on a 
single night in January.”34 These “period of time” studies have provided some of the 
best data about the homeless population in the United States. 
Despite the flaws with data collection on the homeless population, there is a 
good pool of information gathered over the last twenty years that can be used to 
make conclusions about who composes the homeless population. One undisputed, 
empirical conclusion is “that homelessness is associated with extreme poverty.”35 
Commencing in the Great Depression, and continuing through today, there has 
been a growing chasm separating the rich from the poor in the United States.36 This 
income inequality has manifested in different proportions of America’s population 
suffering worse life, health, and economic outcomes than others. These outcomes 
are clearly represented in the composition of America’s homeless. 
 
28  SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 51. 
29  Id. at 50–51. 
30  Id. at 51. 
31  Id. 
32  Id. at 52; Lee-Anderson, supra note 20. 
33  See Lee-Anderson, supra note 20. 
34  SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 52. 
35  Id. at 54. 
36  DEBORAH K. PADGETT, BENJAMIN F. HENWOOD & SAM J. TSEMBERIS, HOUSING FIRST: ENDING HOMELESSNESS, 
TRANSFORMING SYSTEMS, AND CHANGING LIVES 16 (2015). 
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Social factors, combined with economic and historic events, collectively 
created a huge disparity of African Americans, as compared to whites, in the 
homeless population. Segregation, the high demand for single-family homes 
following World War II, “white flight” to the suburbs, red-lining tactics, and 
draconian drug policies all contributed to the multiplicity of hurdles faced by 
African Americans to buy homes or enhance their economic statuses.37 The result is 
bleak:  
Members of racial and ethnic minorities constitute about one third of 
the U.S. population, one half of the poor, and almost two thirds of the 
homeless. African Americans constitute 12% of the U.S. population, 
about one half of the homeless, and up to 85% of the long-term or 
chronically homeless (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 2010).38 
In short, the total United States population of specific minority groups, including 
and especially African Americans, is dramatically overrepresented in the homeless. 
Apart from racial disparities, there are other disparately represented groups 
in the homeless population. This population, in general, is composed of far more 
men than women: “[a]mongst individuals . . . 70 percent are men.”39 Moreover, 
many more individuals than families experience homelessness: seventy percent are 
individuals, and thirty percent of the population are “people in families with 
children.”40 Another salient subpopulation is unaccompanied youth, which includes 
those under the age of twenty-five.41 These youth compose about six percent of the 
total homeless population.42 Veterans, too, compose seven percent of the total 
homeless populace.43 
Beyond those who are already struggling with homelessness, there remain 
households who face a constant risk of homelessness. This population includes 
many who live paycheck to paycheck and who struggle to afford basic necessities.44 
These impoverished individuals and families turn to government assistance for help 
fending off eviction and locating affordable housing—even temporarily.45 In the 
1960s, the U.S. government passed federal legislative intervention to aid low-
income people with housing expenses.46 Subsequently, Nixon’s election and “the 
 
37  Id. at 17–18. 
38  Id. at 17 (emphasis added). 
39  State of Homelessness: 2020 Edition, NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, 
https://endhomelessness.org/homelessness-in-america/homelessness-statistics/state-of-homelessness-report/ 
(last visited Jan. 19, 2021). 
40  Id. 
41  Id. 
42  Id. 
43  Id. 
44  See id. 
45  Id. 
46  See generally Robert Haveman, Rebecca Blank, Robert Moffitt, Timothy Smeeding & Geoffrey Wallace, The 
War on Poverty: Measurement, Trends, and Policy, 34 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 593 (2015). 
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economic recession of the 1970s put an effective halt to new public housing 
developments.”47 Then, in the 1980s, the government contributed to the growing 
problem by dramatically reducing federally subsidized housing.48 Despite rising 
housing costs, the federal budget for housing assistance dropped almost in half from 
1976 to 2002.49 Now, 1.2 million households are on the verge of homelessness, 
relying on public housing despite the poor conditions, strict oversight, and long 
waiting lists.50 In total, 42.6 million Americans survive hand-to-mouth—13.4% of 
the United States population.51 Despite the enormous need, there remains a “7.2 
million unit shortage of affordable rental units available to our nation’s lowest 
income renters.”52 This shortage means many of our nation’s poorest people will 
struggle to find a place to live: 
To put this into context, this means that for every 100 extremely poor 
households in the country, only 31 will find affordable and available 
rental units. Sixty-nine of the 100 will be forced to pay more than they 
can afford, leaving them unstably housed and vulnerable to 
homelessness.53 
It is no secret why seeking and advocating for solutions to the threat of 
homelessness is an important policy pursuit. A substantial population of Americans 
constantly teeter on the verge of homelessness, and vulnerable populations—
overrepresented in the total homeless population—are made more vulnerable by 
their homeless status.54 In fact, homeless individuals have a harder time finding 
and keeping jobs, their children are deprived of the opportunity to continually 
attend school, and they are at much higher risk to suffer from “illness, mental 
health problems, substance abuse and crime.”55 State and local governments have 
employed a number of different  programs to attempt to address the issue, but in 
2017, America’s homeless population rose for the first time in years.56 This rise 
evidences the lack of progress made by many of these initiatives. Thus, lawyers 
should propose a solution to address the homeless population: to impose a higher 
 
47  PADGETT ET AL., supra note 36, at 19. 
48  NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS: ENDING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF 
HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 18 (2018), https://nlchp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Housing-Not-
Handcuffs.pdf. 
49  PADGETT ET AL., supra note 36, at 19. 
50  See id. at 19. 
51  Emily Walkenhorst, Census Figures Show Drop in State Poverty, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Sept. 13, 2018) 
https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2018/sep/13/census-figures-show-drop-state-poverty/. 
52  NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, supra note 48, at 19. 
53  Id. 
54  Homelessness and Racial Disparities, NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, 
https://endhomelessness.org/homelessness-in-america/what-causes-homelessness/inequality/ (last updated 
Oct. 2020). 
55  SCHWARTZ, supra note 3. 
56  Christopher Weber & Geoff Mulvihill, America’s Homeless Population Rises for the First Time in Years, AP 
NEWS (Dec. 6, 2017), https://apnews.com/47662ad74baf4bb09f40619e4fd25a94/America%27s-homeless-
population-rises-for-first-time-in-years. 
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level of scrutiny on the statutes that directly affect and oppress this group. This 
method would force state and local governments to employ alternatives aside from 
criminalizing homelessness. Without so many hurdles in the way of rebuilding their 
lives—like arrest for frivolous misdemeanors, and mounting court costs for 
trespassing tickets—homeless individuals will be empowered to address their first 
and most prominent problem: finding a home. 
 
B. Constitutional Background 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, stated 
generally, ensures the citizenship and equality of all persons. It declares that the 
states may not deprive “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of the law” or deprive “any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”57 The Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses are part of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, but they tend to operate separately 
from each other. 
The Equal Protection Clause applies to the state and federal government 
with equal force. Although there is no equal protection clause in the Fifth 
Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection clause has been 
interpreted to apply to the Federal Government.58 The Court has, over time, cast a 
skeptical eye on statutes drawing classifications between groups of people.59 
Statutes drawing distinctions based on “suspect classifications” are subjected 
to a higher level of judicial review.60 The Supreme Court applies heightened 
scrutiny to laws found to discriminate against classes of people based on race, 
alienage, and national origin.61 The Court also applies heightened scrutiny to laws 
found to discriminate against people based on sex and illegitimacy.62 These are 
considered “quasi-suspect” classes.63 Some state courts have found that classifying 
people according to sexual orientation also demands heightened scrutiny.64 To 
 
57  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
58  See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954). 
59  See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); United 
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304. U.S. 144, 153 (1938).  
60  Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4. 
61  See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
62  See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion); Courtney A. Powers, 
Finding LGBTs a Suspect Class: Assessing the Political Power of LGBTs as a Basis for the Court’s 
Application of Heightened Scrutiny, 17 DUKE J. GENDER, L. & POL’Y 385, 387 (2010) (“[T]he U.S. Supreme 
Court has applied heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate based on several ‘suspect’ classifications: 
race, alienage, and national origin. It has also applied such scrutiny to ‘quasi-suspect’ classes including sex 
and illegitimacy.”). 
63  Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 426, 430 (Conn. 2008). See generally Rachel F. Moran, 
Quasi-Suspect Classes and Proof of Discriminatory Intent: A New Model, 90 YALE L.J. 912 (1981) (reviewing 
the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence and the development of suspect and quasi-suspect 
classes). 
64   Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 481 (holding a statutory ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional on equal 
protection grounds). 
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argue statutes that draw distinctions based on suspect classes are constitutional, 
the government must show that the statute is “precisely tailored” to serve a 
compelling state interest.65 To show that statutes drawing distinctions based on 
quasi-suspect classes are constitutional, the government must show an “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” substantially related to a state interest.66 If the 
government cannot meet its burden, the law is deemed unconstitutional. 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mirrors the language 
from the Fifth Amendment, effectively applying “due process” requirements to the 
states.67 Due process includes two elements: procedural and substantive due 
process.68 Underlying these elements are other subsets of rights considered 
protected by due process.69 
Substantive due process requires that governmental actors do not deprive 
individuals of life, liberty, or property “even if those individuals receive an 
adjudication in which ‘even the fairest possible procedure[s]’ are observed.”70 
“General law” due process protections are encompassed in the substantive Due 
Process Clause.71 This “conception interpreted due process to require general and 
impartial laws rather than ‘special’ or ‘class’ legislation that imposed particular 
burdens upon, or accorded special benefits to, particular persons or particular 
segments of society.”72 The general law due process accords similar protections to 
those conveyed through the Equal Protection Clause; however, the most commonly 
referenced and recognized form of substantive due process is “fundamental rights” 
due process.73 Under this doctrine, the Court determined that certain rights are so 
“fundamental” that if the legislature passes a law infringing on those rights, the law 
will be reviewed under a heightened scrutiny.74 If the Court finds that the 
infringement on the fundamental right is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
state interest[,]” then the law is constitutional.75 If that showing is not made, then 
the law is unconstitutional.76 
Procedural due process requires governmental actors and the judiciary to 
abide by a certain form of conduct during trial and ensure rules of fairness are 
 
65  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982). 
66  See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532–34. 
67  See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1. 
68  See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 408 (2010). 
69  See id. at 419–20. 
70  Id. at 419 & n.37 (alteration in original) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)). 
71  Id. at 423–24. 
72  Id. at 425. 
73  See id. at 427. 
74  Williams, supra note 68, at 427. 
75  Id. 
76  See id. 
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observed during that process.77 Two of the better recognized procedural trial 
requirements are notice and the opportunity for a hearing.78 The Supreme Court 
also recognized that the law requires “actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, 
opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some settled course of judicial 
proceedings . . .” for there to be adequate procedure.79 Accordingly, the most well-
recognized application of procedural due process principles is courts’ obligation to 
ensure fair procedures, meaning “compliance with duly enacted law and the 
formality of an adjudication[, in addition to requiring] . . . that the judicial 
procedures applied in connection with such an adjudication satisfy some normative 
conception of farness . . . .”80 To determine if compliance with these fundamental 
procedural and fairness principles has been met, the Court applies the three-factor 
balancing test promulgated in Mathews v. Eldridge.81 
 
C. The Criminalization of Homelessness: Statutory Challenges to be Made on 
Equal Protection and Due Process Grounds 
 
When lawyers file lawsuits against governing bodies—local, state, and 
federal—they base constitutional challenges brought under these clauses on 
statutes promulgated by the governing body in question. These statutes tend to be a 
response to community residents who feel that homeless people are unsightly or 
dangerous.82 By utilizing criminal justice measures, the legislature can effectively 
curtail the visibility of people experiencing homelessness.83 
There are numerous types of statutes aimed at remedying the unsightly 
presence of homeless people in neighborhoods. These include: “mak[ing] it illegal to 
sleep, sit, or store personal belongings in public spaces”;84 making it illegal to camp 
or use some type of shelter, makeshift or otherwise, on public or private property;85 
banning sleeping in cars;86 punishing people for begging or panhandling;87 
 
77  See id. at 418 (“According to Justice Roberts, ‘[p]rocedural due process has to do with the manner of trial 
[and] dictates that in conduct of judicial inquiry certain fundamental rules of fairness be observed.’” 
(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 137 (Roberts, J., dissenting))). 
78  See Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 2 (2006). 
79  Williams, supra note 68, at 466 (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 272, 280 (1855)). 
80  Id. at 421–22. 
81  424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976); Williams, supra note 68, at 422 & n.45 (“[C]ourts balance: (1) ‘the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action’; (2) ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards’; and (3) ‘the Government’s interest, including function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substituted procedural requirement would entail.’” (quoting 
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335)). 
82  U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, supra note 4, at 5–6. 
83  Id. 
84  Id. at 6. 
85  NAT’L L. CTR ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, supra note 48, at 23. 
86  Id. at 25; U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, supra note 4, at 6. 
87  NAT’L L. CTR ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, supra note 48, at 25. 
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“ban[ning] or limit[ing] food distribution in public places . . . .”;88 making it illegal to 
use the bathroom or wash oneself outside (regardless of bathroom availability in the 
area);89 and “selective[ly] enforcing neutral laws such as jaywalking, loitering, 
trespassing, and open container laws against people who are homeless.”90 These are 
the statutes that should be challenged under the Fourteenth and Fifth 
Amendments’ Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 
To make the challenges, a lawyer may argue on his client’s behalf that the 
legislation is unconstitutional “on its face” or “as applied” to the client.91 This 
challenge makes it possible for the judiciary to invalidate the legislation.92 If a court 
determines that a statute is unconstitutional on its face, then “it must be 
invalidated as to all possible applications and is thus rendered null and void.”93 If a 
court instead invalidates the statute as applied to the plaintiff(s) bringing suit, the 
statute is invalid “only as applied to the plaintiff’s particular circumstances, in 
which case the statute remains valid for other applications that do not raise similar 
constitutional concerns.”94 While invalidating a statute on its face may be a more 
expansive remedy, a lawyer’s argument that a statute is unconstitutional as applied 
can also invalidate statutes enforced against the homeless. If a statute is struck for 
being unconstitutionally enforced against the homeless population, then it cannot 





There are a number of different methods to obtain a higher level of scrutiny 
than rational basis review. The three higher degrees of scrutiny are (in order from 
highest to lowest): (1) strict scrutiny; (2) intermediate scrutiny; and (3) rational 
basis with a bite scrutiny.96 Each level of scrutiny can be argued for in different 
ways. 
 
88  Id. 
89  U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, supra note 4, at 6. 
90  Id. See generally NAT’L L. CTR ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, supra note 48, at 22–26. 
91  See, e.g., Allen v. City of Sacramento, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 654, 659–60 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (challenging an 
anti-camping ordinance on the basis that it is unconstitutional as written and because the city enforces the 
ordinance in a discriminatory way). See generally Stefanie A. Lindquist & Pamela C. Corley, The Multiple-
Stage Process of Judicial Review: Facial and As-Applied Constitutional Challenges to Legislation Before the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 467 (2011). 
92  Lindquist & Corley, supra note 91, at 469. 
93  Id. 
94  Id. 
95  See id. 
96  Traditionally, “rational basis with a bite” scrutiny has not been formally recognized by the court. However, 
scholars and practitioners in the legal profession generally accept it as a higher form of scrutiny. For a brief 
overview of rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny standards, see R. Randall Kelso, 
Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting 
Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225 
(2002). For a brief overview of rational basis with a bite review, see Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, Note, 
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A. Strict Scrutiny 
 
The best way to argue for strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment is 
by asserting that the statutes at issue infringe on the homeless plaintiff’s equal 
protection and due process rights. The Court’s evolving doctrine reveals that the 
Court has given credence to arguments that refer to statutory right violations 
having to do with wealth inequities, so long as the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses are violated.97 Indeed, by focusing on the intersection between 
procedural due process and equal protection, the Court has the opportunity to “get[] 
at the heart of an urgent, practical problem: indigent people often suffer from both 
(1) arbitrary decision-making and inadequate access to courts, as well as, (2) the 
unequal outcomes that result.”98 Sometimes, claims brought under both clauses are 
dubbed “equal process” claims.99 These claims are increasingly featured in court 
opinions.100 Accordingly, scholars believe bringing claims consistent with this 
reasoning may yield promising results for plaintiffs’.101  
Although this analysis has yet to be recognized by the Supreme Court as a 
way to trigger strict scrutiny, scholars Brandon L. Garrett and Kerry Abrams 
theorize that by relying on the intersection of these two rights, “separate concerns 
with procedural arbitrariness can heighten the concern about discrimination.”102 By 
combining the issues into a single procedural and substantive claim under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a lawyer can argue that “[g]roups left out of the political 
process may face arbitrary treatment, which is of distinct concern and adds weight 
to their claims, even if they are not recognized as a suspect class . . . .”103 This was 
essentially the route taken by the Eleventh Circuit in Jones v. Governor of 
Florida.104 There, the court applied heightened scrutiny where felons were 
 
Reconciling Rational-Basis Review: When Does Rational Basis Bite?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070 (2015), and 
Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. 
L.J. 779 (1987). 
97  See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665–67, 674 (1983) (holding that there was a constitutional violation 
where unfair process and wealth inequality were at issue); Brandon L. Garrett, Wealth, Equal Protection, 
and Due Process, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 402 (2019) (“Yet wealth disparities do still receive careful 
equal protection scrutiny, just not based on equal protection alone.”); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal 
Protection, HARV. L. REV. 747, 749–50 (2011) [hereinafter Yoshino, New Equal Protection] (“The Court has 
long used the Due Process Clauses to further equality concerns, such as those relating to indigent 
individuals, national origin minorities, racial minorities, religious minorities, sexual minorities, and 
women.” (emphasis added)). 
98  Garrett, supra note 97, at 405. 
99  Id. at 402 (“‘[E]qual process’ claims arise from the line of Supreme Court and lower court cases in which 
wealth inequality is a central concern.”). For purposes of this article, I will refer to these types of claims as 
equal process claims. 
100  Id. at 402–03. 
101  Id. at 405–06. 
102  Id. at 447. 
103  Id.  
104  950 F.3d 795 (11th Cir. 2020). 
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foreclosed from exercising their right to vote if they had outstanding court fees.105 
The court explained:  
heightened scrutiny applies in this case because we are faced with a 
narrow exception to traditional rational basis review: the creation of 
wealth classification that punishes those genuinely unable to pay fees, 
fines and restitution more harshly than those able to pay—that is, it 
punishes more harshly solely on account of wealth . . . .106 
This argument, therefore, could persuade courts that statutes criminalizing 
homelessness should be reviewed under strict scrutiny.107 
The leading case joining the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to 
hold a statute unconstitutional is Bearden v. Georgia.108 Bearden involved an 
indigent individual who was imprisoned as a result of his inability to pay fines and 
fees required by his probation.109 The Supreme Court analyzed the issue by 
reviewing Due Process and Equal Protection jurisprudence, concluding that 
utilizing principles from both clauses separately was not a novel methodology to 
deciding cases.110 The Court implied that to determine the statute’s 
constitutionality, the Court must address both the due process and equal protection 
questions presented, in a single analysis:111 
Whether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the 
issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole 
analysis, but rather requires a careful inquiry into such factors as “the 
nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is 
affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative means 
and purpose, and the existence of alternative means for effectuating 
the purpose . . . .”112 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court utilized this doctrine to invalidate statutes that 
infringed on the plaintiff’s converging equality and due process rights. 
Homeless plaintiffs have a good argument that statutes effectively 
criminalizing homelessness are unconstitutional using an equal process analysis. 
Statutes, such as those targeting “camping” or “panhandling,” classify such 
 
105  Id. at 804, 808–09. 
106  Id. at 809. 
107  See Garrett, supra note 97, at 446–47. See generally Fred Lautz, Note, Equal Protection and Revocation of 
an Indigent’s Probation for Failure to Meet Monetary Conditions: Bearden v. Georgia, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 121 
(reviewing Bearden v. Georgia and its progeny, concluding that the line of cases suggests courts should 
apply strict scrutiny to cases where defendants are treated differently in the criminal justice system due to 
their wealth). 
108  461 U.S. 660, 660 (1983) (holding the statute was unconstitutional as applied). 
109  Id. at 661. 
110  Id. at 664–67. 
111  Id. at 665–66; see also Garrett, supra, note 97, at 419 (“The Court did not suggest that it was departing 
from Rodriguez and applying heightened scrutiny to class-based discrimination. Instead, the result followed 
from the combination of class-based harm and unfair and arbitrary procedures. It was an intersectional and 
cumulative analysis.”). 
112  Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666–67 (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
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activities as misdemeanors.113 Misdemeanor charges result either in minor fines or 
in jail time; sometimes both. The main difference between misdemeanors and 
felonies is that the former class of crime is minor and as such punishment is 
limited—usually by up to 364 days in jail and a certain monetary payment.114 
Because homeless individuals have scarce, if any, access to money, the court may be 
influenced to impose jail time for any charge accrued. Alternatively, if the court 
imposes a fine, the homeless plaintiff is usually not in a position to pay it. If they 
don’t pay it, the individual will be in a position where they could be charged with 
another crime, or imprisoned.115 While challenging a specific statute will require a 
more specific analysis showing wealth discrimination against the homeless, this 
type of statutory enforcement scheme is clearly identifiable discrimination based on 
economic status.  
There are alternatives to this type of criminalization. There are innumerable 
government-funded and NGO conducted studies showing alternatives to 
criminalization are viable and result in decreased numbers of homeless.116 For 
example, in Syracuse, New York, Mayor Stephanie Miner’s rejection of 
criminalization policies and her emphasis on a Housing First model resulted in the 
city becoming one of the nation’s first to end veteran homelessness.117 Thus, while 
proponents of criminalization statutes purport the statutes to be a remedy for 
homelessness, the total deprivation of liberty and the perpetuation of homelessness 
that results from the arrest of these individuals cannot be logically shown to further 
legislative means and purpose. 
 
B. Intermediate Scrutiny 
 
Intermediate scrutiny is fundamentally a subset of heightened scrutiny. In 
other words, arguing for strict and intermediate scrutiny is essentially the same.118 
 
113  See SACRAMENTO, CAL., CODE § 12.52.030 (effective Jan. 14, 2021) (prohibiting camping or using “camp 
paraphernalia” on any public or private property); MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 37-8 (2020) (prohibiting 
panhandling in downtown business district of the city); see also Mark Roseman, Misdemeanors: Trapdoor 
Justice for the Poor and Homeless, MEDIUM (Feb. 07, 2019), 
https://medium.com/@markeroseman/misdemeanors-trapdoor-justice-for-the-poor-and-homeless-
7ddf47ba72fc (discussing the criminalization of unavoidable behaviors). 
114  Misdemeanor Sentencing Trends, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 29, 2019) , 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/misdemeanor-sentencing-trends.aspx (“The most 
common misdemeanor-felony penalty threshold is one year.”); Roseman, supra note 113 (citing aggravated 
misdemeanors in California with a maximum punishment of up to 364 days in jail and a fine in excess of 
$1,000). 
115  See Joseph Shapiro, Jail Time for Unpaid Court Fines and Fees Can Create Cycle of Poverty, NPR (Feb. 9, 
2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/02/09/384968360/jail-time-for-unpaid-court-fines-and-
fees-can-create-cycle-of-poverty; see also Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor are Paying the Price, 
NPR (May 19, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-the-poor 
(discussing the poverty cycle of court fees for low-income individuals). 
116  See, e.g., U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, supra note 4, at 36–38 (proposing empirical 
solutions as alternatives to criminalization of homelessness in communities). 
117  NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, supra note 48, at 40. 
118  See Pollvogt, supra note 15, at 743 (“Levels of scrutiny . . . come in essentially two varieties: rational basis 
review and heightened scrutiny.”). 
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A court determines based on these arguments which “heightened” scrutiny to 
impose. The traditional equal protection analysis is likely a better-suited argument 
for intermediate scrutiny than strict scrutiny due to precedent showing the Court’s 
recent apprehension to recognize suspect classes solely under the Equal Protection 
clause.119 Although it is unclear how the Court separates classes deemed quasi-
suspect or suspect, if a class possesses at least some of the characteristics necessary 
to be suspect, “it should qualify at least for protection as a quasi-suspect class.”120 
Homeless people should be deemed a “quasi-suspect” class in accord with 
equal protection and statutes discriminating against them should trigger 
intermediate scrutiny. It has already been determined that aside from narrow 
exceptions, wealth discrimination requires only rational basis review.121 In San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Court stated that wealth 
discrimination alone was not enough to merit strict scrutiny.122 There, the plaintiffs 
challenged Texas’s statutory taxation scheme that enabled children with wealthier 
families to pay more taxes to their school and consequently the wealthier district 
paid much more in per-pupil expenses.123 The Court found that strict scrutiny was 
unavailable to the plaintiffs because they were unable to show that the statutory 
scheme discriminated against a specific class of poor individuals while also 
demonstrating an absolute deprivation of education.124 However, there are 
differences in the discriminatory effects of the statute at issue in Rodriguez and 
statutes that could be challenged for criminalizing homeless people. Moreover, the 
Court acknowledged that the classification issue presented in Rodriguez was “sui 
generis,”125 so the Court would not likely find the same problems in a challenge 
brought for homeless plaintiffs. Accordingly, no court has yet determined if the 
homeless are a suspect or quasi-suspect class.126 Although, improbable, arguing for 
heightened scrutiny under the traditional Equal Protection Clause analysis may yet 
avail. 
 
119  See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445–46 (1985) (holding mentally retarded 
people are not a suspect class); Yoshino, New Equal Protection, supra note 84, at 748 (“Over the past 
decades, the Court has systematically denied constitutional protection to new groups, curtailed it for 
already covered groups, and limited Congress’s capacity to protect groups through civil rights legislation.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
120  Moran, supra note 63, at 918–19. 
121  See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (“[T]his Court has held repeatedly that poverty, standing 
alone, is not a suspect classification.” (citing James v. Valterra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971))). 
122  411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973). 
123  Id. at 4–16. 
124  Id. at 25–26. 
125  Id. at 18. 
126  See, e.g., Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442, 1449 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (“[Plaintiffs acknowledge] 
that there is no precedent recognizing the homeless as a suspect class . . . .”). However, some courts have 
acknowledged that the homeless may be a suspect class. See Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1578 
(S.D. Fla. 1992) (“This court is not entirely convinced that homelessness as a class has none of these 
‘traditional indicia of suspectness.’ It can be argued that the homeless are saddled with such disabilities, or 
have been subjected to a history of unequal treatment or are so politically powerless that extraordinary 
protection of the homeless as a class is warranted.”). 
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To argue for intermediate scrutiny, it is necessary to show that a certain 
class is “quasi-suspect.” Courts recognize a class as suspect if the group has the 
“indicia of suspectness.”127 This indicia presents in a set of factors, including that 
the group: (1) is a discrete and insular minority, (2) is politically powerless, (3) has 
historically been discriminated against, (4) has a trait unrelated to the group’s 
capacity to contribute to society, and (5) has an immutable trait.128 A court 
determines whether the class is suspect based on how many of these factors are 
met.129 The “qualification for quasi-suspectness turns on whether a class shares at 
least some . . . indicia of suspectness.”130 It may also be important to the court that 
the class in question overlaps with other recognized suspect classes.131 
The “discrete and insular minority” has been interpreted by the Supreme 
Court in two ways: broadly and narrowly.132 The homeless, as a class, fit both 
definitions. The broad definition, promulgated in Carolene Products, describes a 
discrete and insular minority as ‘“any socially isolated minority group,’ or any group 
that is ‘not embraced within the bond of community kinship, but . . . held at arm’s 
length by the group or groups that possess dominant political and economic 
power.’”133 The narrow, linguistic definition requires that the class is literally 
isolated from the mainstream. The homeless are both self-isolated and isolated by 
the general public.134 Localities and state governments commonly adopt 
enforcement tactics and legislation that criminalize homeless individuals, thereby 
accommodating community members who complain about the homeless individual’s 
presence.135 Moreover, governments may build shelters in an attempt to “sweep 
homeless people from public view.”136 As a result of these tactics, homeless people 
effectively go into hiding “by living in more dispersed groups or even alone.”137 If a 
class is shown to be a discrete and insular minority, the Court has acknowledged 
that it is required to engage in a more searching inquiry to ensure its equality is 
 
127  Moran, supra note 63, at 916. 
128  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442–47 (1985); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677, 686–87 (1973). 
129  Pollvogt, supra note 15, at 742. 
130  Moran, supra note 63, at 916 (emphasis added). 
131  Id. at 920 (discussing additional, non-determinative factor of overlap). 
132  Jennifer E. Watson, Note, When No Place is Home: Why the Homeless Deserve Suspect Classification, 88 
IOWA L. REV. 501, 516–18 (2003). 
133  Id. at 516–17 (alternations in original) (quoting Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products 
Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1105 n.72 (1982)). 
134  SCHNABLY, supra note 19, at 556–60 (explaining how local governments have engaged in a strategy to make 
the homeless “invisible,” and how the homeless have accommodated that strategy by employing the same to 
avoid harassment). 
135  See supra Part I.C. (explaining criminalization motives and methods for locales and governments). 
136  SCHNABLY, supra note 19, at 559. 
137  Id. at 560. 
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upheld.138 This factor is arguably the most persuasive and important to the 
courts.139 
The unhoused population are also a politically powerless group. They 
struggle to exercise the right to vote due to residency and domicile requirements, 
and identification requirements, among others.140 As the Supreme Court explained, 
“the political franchise of voting is . . . regarded as a fundamental political right, 
because [it is] preservative of all rights.”141 As such, without a residence, the 
unhoused population inevitably do not meet residency requirements and cannot 
influence the political process.142 There has been some organization around 
homeless rights in recent years, but it is important to note that “much of the 
political organizing . . . has relied heavily on appeals to the charity of the better-
off.”143 Making headway in politics is no easy task and requires powerful allies and 
advocates. These allies are hard to find absent personal assets or clout—of which 
the homeless have neither. 
Beginning in the fourteenth century and continuing today, the homeless have 
been subject to discrimination.144 In the 1600’s, the homeless, otherwise known as 
“vagrants,” and later “tramps,” were social outcasts, considered no better than 
criminals.145 Indeed, “[t]he homeless have overwhelmingly been ‘subjected to a 
history of purposeful and unequal treatment.’”146 This discriminatory treatment and 
terminology used to describe the homeless has continued today. Current 
criminalization statutory schemes reveal legislatures’ disdain for the homeless, and 
the lack of community reprimand for such legislation reveals implicit agreement—
at the very least—by the general public.147 Beyond legislation, many homeless 
individuals report they have suffered discrimination by private businesses and law 
 
138  United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4; see Watson, supra note 132, at 516. 
139  See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1012 (1978) (arguing that discreteness and 
insularity should be the central criteria of suspectness and quasi-suspectness). 
140  Watson, supra note 132, at 522; see Kriston Capps, Voting While Homeless, BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (Nov. 8, 
2016, 4:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-08/the-struggle-to-vote-while-homeless. 
141  Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); see also Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 
663, 667 (1966) (holding poll tax violates Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S 533, 562 (1964) (holding states must create legislative districts with substantially equal 
number of voters to comply with Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). 
142  Watson, supra note 132, at 522. But see SCHNABLY, supra note 19, at 569 (“[H]omeless people have formed 
unions . . . [t]hey have marched to city halls, invaded city council meetings, occupied local housing offices, 
and initiated drives to register to vote, all in an effort to give themselves their own voice in politics.”). 
143  SCHNABLY, supra note 19, at 570. 
144  Watson, supra note 132, at 523. 
145   KENNETH L. KUSMER, DOWN AND OUT, ON THE ROAD: THE HOMELESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 13, 29 (2001) (“As 
early as 1640 ‘vagrant persons’ were listed among the social outcasts that peace officers in Boston were 
charged with apprehending.”). 
146  Watson, supra note 132, at 523 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). 
147  See supra Part I.C. 
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enforcement.148 Poor public perception and discrimination is reflected ubiquitously 
in both historic and present treatment of the homeless in the United States. 
The fact of an individual’s homelessness does not bear on his ability to 
contribute to society. A characteristic that "bears no relation to [the] ability to 
perform or contribute to society” serves as a suspect basis to classify a group.149 The 
homeless have no outstanding character traits, disabilities, or criminal proclivities 
deterring their ability to contribute to society.150 Instead, they are a group suffering 
due to the shortfalls in America’s system of government, that leaves its most 
impoverished without stable housing.151 “A peaceful beggar poses no threat to 
society.”152 Homelessness, therefore, is not a classification that relates in any way to 
an individual’s ability to contribute to society and, if used as a statutory 
classification, would “have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class . . . to 
inferior legal status.”153 
The final factor, immutability, is defined by courts more broadly than the text 
suggests.154 Immutability is sometimes defined as a “non-volitional 
characteristic.”155 Logic, precedent, and case studies contend that homelessness is 
necessarily involuntary.156 However, even if the Court determines homelessness 
 
148  Scott Keyes, Virtually All Homeless People Experience Discrimination, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 21, 2014, 5:16 
PM), https://archive.thinkprogress.org/virtually-all-homeless-people-experience-discrimination-
126b5eb4d610/ (“More than 70 percent reported they had experienced discrimination from private 
businesses. Two in three said they’d been unfairly targeted by law enforcement. . . .”). 
149  Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
150  See generally Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1582–83 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (discussing how the homeless 
are no more criminal, or disabled than any other portion of society, aside from their poverty). 
151  See supra Part II.A (discussing the causes of homelessness, namely that the government cut federal funding 
over the last twenty years instead of supplementing it, or adjusting it for inflation); see also U.S. 
INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, supra note 4, at 6 (“The current economic recession and 
foreclosure crisis exacerbate the problem of homelessness, threatening to push these numbers even higher, 
as they have resulted in federal, state, and local budgetary limitations that undercut the ability of 
communities to provide adequate housing and services needed to prevent and end homelessness.”). 
152  Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1583. 
153  Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686–87.  
154  See Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 96, at 2085 (citing Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 
1989) (en banc) (Norris, J., concurring) (“It is clear that by ‘immutability’ the Court has never meant strict 
immutability in the sense that members of the class must be physically unable to change or mask the trait 
defining their class. People can have operations to change their sex. Aliens can ordinarily become 
naturalized citizens. The status of illegitimate children can be changed. People can frequently hide their 
national origin by changing their customs, their names, or their associations. Lighter skinned blacks can 
sometimes ‘pass’ for white, as can Latinos for Anglos, and some people can even change their racial 
appearance with pigment injections. At a minimum, then, the Supreme Court is willing to treat a trait as 
effectively immutable if changing it would involve great difficulty, such as requiring a major physical 
change or a traumatic change of identity.”). 
155  Watson, supra note 132, at 527. 
156  See Jessica Lipscomb, Advocate’s Videos Tell the Story of Miami Beach’s Homeless, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Nov. 
17, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/advocates-videos-tell-the-story-of-miami-beachs-
homeless-8928779 (“Through the process of filming her videos, Navarette found only one person who said he 
was cool with being homeless. Everyone else unequivocally agreed they’d rather be in a shelter, hotel, or 
apartment.”). See generally NAT’L L. CTR ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, supra note 48 (discussing the many 
reasons causing individuals and families to be homeless–all involuntary). For an analysis showing why the 
court should hold homelessness is an immutable characteristic, see Watson, supra note 132, at 526–33. 
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does not fit the Court’s definition, immutability is considered neither a necessary 
nor sufficient factor to show a class should receive heightened scrutiny.157  
The overwhelming analysis showing homelessness meets most factors for 
suspectness should be persuasive to the judiciary that the homeless are at least a 
quasi-suspect class. Notably, huge disparities in racial minorities represented in the 
homeless population as compared to the general population may lend more support 
to the argument that the class should be afforded more protection by the Court.158 
These disparities, in conjunction with the extra weight accorded those classes 
deemed “discrete and insular,” is more evidence that the homeless should receive 
heightened scrutiny. 
 
C. Rational Basis “with a Bite” Scrutiny 
 
Rational basis “with a bite” review has never been explicitly mentioned by 
the United States Supreme Court.159 However, considering the extremely 
deferential nature of rational basis review, when the Court has invalidated statutes 
under this standard, it “appears to be employing a higher standard.”160 Scholars 
dubbed this standard “rational basis with a bite.”161 
There are two predominant interpretations of how and when rational basis 
“bites.” The first employs the same traditional equal protection analysis used to 
determine if a class is suspect or quasi-suspect.162 It arguably utilizes more factors 
than the traditional analysis, including and especially: animus.163 The second 
interpretation focuses solely on that factor.164 Under this interpretation, the 
plaintiff’s burden is only to show the presence of actual animus for the court to 
strike down the law.165 The first interpretation relies on the same analysis done in 
the preceding section, and for that reason, this section will focus on the second 
interpretation.166 
For legislation to be struck down in accord with a biting rational basis 
review, a lawyer will have to show that the legislation was promulgated with a 
 
157  See Moran, supra note 63, at 918 (“Immutability . . . cannot serve as a touchstone of suspectness, even 
though it is not entirely irrelevant.”); Pollvogt, supra note 15, at 742 (explaining that of the numerous 
factors used to determine the suspectness of a class, only some portion of them must be shown for the court 
to grant suspect or quasi-suspect status). 
158  See supra Part I.A. 
159  Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 96, at 2072–73; see also Kenji Yoshino, Why the Court Can Strike Down 
Marriage Restrictions Under Rational-Basis Review, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331, 333 (2013) 
[hereinafter Yoshino, Rational-Basis Review] (“Ordinary rational-basis review, then, operates as a free pass 
for legislation.”). 
160  Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 96, at 2071–72. 
161  Id. 
162  Id. at 2072. 
163  Yoshino, Rational-Basis Review, supra note 159, at 335. 
164  See id.  
165  See id. (explaining that precedent and logic belie the argument that the plaintiff must rebut any and all 
other reasons for legislation to the exclusion of the sole desire to harm a group). 
166  See supra Part II.B. 
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“bare . . . desire to harm” a specific group.167 In the seminal case, Moreno, the Court 
reviewed the legislative history and found that the statute at issue passed in order 
to “prevent so-called ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’ from participating in the” 
government program.168 The Court explained that such a bare desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group could not constitute a legitimate governmental 
interest.169 If the Court would have upheld such a provision on those grounds, it 
would essentially discredit the constitutional right to equality.170 Subsequently, 
when the Court has detected animus it has imposed a rational basis with a bite 
standard of review.171  
The Court has detected animus through either direct evidence or inferential 
evidence based on the structure of the law.172 Direct evidence is often found through 
the legislative history of a piece of legislation, such as in Moreno.173 Alternatively, 
the Court has examined the purported reasons for legislation, and if it ultimately 
finds them incredible, it has inferred animus.174 This is the method the Court 
utilized in Romer, where it explained: “the breadth of the legislation,” was so far 
removed from the justifications for the legislation at issue that they were impossible 
to credit.175 Thus, in order to receive heightened scrutiny by way of rational basis 





There are numerous ways to attain heightened scrutiny for America’s 
homeless under the Fourteenth Amendment. This group exists as a symptom of 
disparities present in the system of government that does not provide aid to its most 
needy and impoverished. Legislatures have an obligation to remedy the struggles 
and vulnerabilities unique to the homeless population. Unfortunately, legislatures 
have for too long relied on the crutch of criminalization. If the judiciary imposes 
heightened scrutiny on statutes discriminating against the homeless, legislatures 
will be forced to focus on more productive measures to fix the problem. By utilizing 
any of the advocacy routes enumerated to attain heightened scrutiny, lawyers 
representing homeless plaintiffs have a strong chance of persuading the judiciary. 
Employing these arguments may result in a more equitable American society and 
jurisprudence. 
 
167  U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
168  Id. 
169  Id. 
170  Id. 
171  See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 432 (1985); see also Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996). 
172  Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 96, at 2093. 
173  413 U.S. at 534; see also United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770–71 (2013) (using direct evidence of 
animus toward homosexuality to strike down a law as unconstitutional with a biting rational basis review). 
174  Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
175  Id. 
